FREE ESSAY ON EXISTENCE OF GOD

EXISTENCE OF GOD

For being accustomed in all other things to make a distinction between existence and
essence, I easily persuade myself that existence may perhaps be separated from the
essence of God, and thus God might be conceived as not existent actually. PROP. XI. God,
or substance, consisting, of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and
infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.
Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God does not exist: then his
essence does not involve existence. --Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason must be
assigned, either for its existence, or for its non-existence --e. g., if a triangle
exist, a reason or cause must be granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does
not exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from existing, or annuls its
existence. If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the existence of
God, or which destroys his existence, we must certainly conclude that he necessarily does
exist. For if it were of the same nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to
exist. But substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God (by Prop.
ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy his existence.
As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine existence cannot be drawn from
anything external to the divine nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist,
be drawn from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction. To make such an
affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect, is absurd;
therefore, neither in the nature of God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or
reason be assigned which would annul his existence. Therefore, God necessarily exists.
--The potentiality of non-existence is a negation of power, and contrariwise the
potentiality of existence is a power, as is obvious. --In this last proof, I have
purposely shown God's existence a posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily
followed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence does not follow a priori.
Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we cannot be more certain of
the existence of anything, than of the existence of a being absolutely infinite or
perfect --that is, of God. Our idea of a most perfect being, not the sole proof of a God.
--How far the idea of a most perfect being which a man may frame in his mind, does or
does not prove the existence of a God, I will not here examine. See now how existence
follows from this notion. To exist is something more than not to exist, or rather,
existence adds a degree to grandeur and perfection, and as Descartes states it, existence
is itself a perfection. KANT
The proposition, God is almighty, contains two concepts, each having its object, namely,
God and almightiness. If, then, I take the subject (God) with all its predicates
(including that of almightiness), and say, God is, or there is a God, I do not put a new
predicate to the concept of God, but I only put the subject by itself, with all its
predicates, in relation to my concept, as its object. If we were concerned with an object
of our senses, I could not mistake the existence of a thing for the mere concept of it;
for by the concept the object is thought as only in harmony with the general conditions
of a possible empirical knowledge, while by its existence it is thought as contained in
the whole content of experience. Then we have the question coming in, Does God exist? The
ontological proof, which is the first properly metaphysical proof of the existence of
God, consequently came to mean that God as the Idea of existence which unites all reality
in itself, also has the reality of existence within Himself; this proof thus follows from
the Notion of God, that He is the universal essence of all essence. For if it is accepted
as in thought alone, we may go on farther to accept it as existent; that, however, is
something greater' than what is merely thought. 'Thus were that beyond which nothing
greater can be thought merely in the understanding, that beyond which nothing greater can
be thought would be something beyond which something greater can be thought. But that is
truly impossible; there thus without doubt exists both in the understanding and in
reality something beyond which nothing greater can be thought.' Secondly, there are two
sorts of objects of thought --one that is and another that is not; the object that is
only thought and does not exist, is as imperfect as that which only is without being
thought. Undoubtedly God would be imperfect, if He were merely thought and did not also
have the determination of Being. But in relation to God we must not take thought as
merely subjective; thought here signifies the absolute, pure thought, and thus we must
ascribe to Him the quality of Being. On the other hand if God were merely Being, if He
were not conscious of Himself as self-consciousness, He would not be Spirit, a thought
that thinks itself.
God is the infinite, just as body and soul, Being and thought are eternally united; this
is the speculative, true definition of God. The thought of God, which is always given,
and the being of which is to be proved, claims, at any rate, to be the highest thought
possible; indeed, upon close comparison with all other thoughts which come and go, with
thoughts of such things as may just as well not exist as exist, it has the essential
peculiarity, the prerogative, so to speak, --and this is Anselm's discovery, --that, if
it is actually thought of as the highest conceivable thought, it is also thought of as
existent. Were it not thought of as being, it would not for a moment be actually thought.
The fool (Ps. xiv.) denies the existence of such a Being. For did it exist only in
intellect, the thought might be framed that it was realised, and that would be a greater
thought. Consequently, there exists, in reality as well as in the understanding,
something a greater than which cannot be thought. And this is so true that its
non-existence cannot be thought. Something may be thought which is only to be thought as
existent, and that is a majus than that the non-existence of which may be thought, and
that You are, O Lord, my God, I must think though I did not believe.' The nerve of the
Anselmic argument lies therefore in the notion that an idea which has an objective
existence is a majus than that to which mere subjective existence appertains; that,
consequently, as under the idea of God the highest thought possible is at any rate
expressed, the idea of God is not thought unless it is thought as existent. That Anselm
also undoubtedly knew, but he opined that the concept of God is different to any other
thought, which remains unaltered, whether it is thought of as existent or non-existent;
the concept of God is that thought, which is no longer thought unless it is thought as
existent, and which, therefore, essentially involves being. But, of course, it is
insufficiently established by Anselm that a concept of God which does not necessarily
include existence, is not the highest thought, and therefore is not the concept of God,
and that, consequently, the really highest thought must also be thought of as existent.
Inasmuch as Anselm treated existence as a majus compared with non-existence, he treated
existence as an attribute, whereas it is the bearer of all attributes. So it is not
proved by Anselm that the origin of this idea, which, when thought, is thought as
existent, is not contingent to the reason, but necessary; and that reason only remains
reason by virtue of this idea. Finally, Anselm thinks, thus overrating the Ontological
moment, that he has already attained therein the full concept of God. For what would it
matter if that which is thought as most perfect were, as thought, less than the least
reality? Why should this thought disturb us? That than which a higher cannot be conceived
cannot exist merely as an idea, because what exists merely as an idea is inferior to what
exists in reality as well as in idea. The idea of a highest Being which exists merely in
thought, is the idea of a highest Being which is not the highest even in thought, but
inferior to a highest Being which exists in fact as well as in thought.' The argument
merely assumes that be who denies that there is a God must have an idea of God. There is
also no force, as Anselm showed, in the objection of Gaunilo, that the existence of God
can no more be inferred from the idea of a perfect being, than the existence of a perfect
island is to be inferred from the idea of such an island. The argument is that a certain
thought of God is found necessarily to imply His existence. The objection that existence
is not a predicate, and that the idea of a God who exists is not more complete and
perfect than the idea of a God who does not exist, is, perhaps, not incapable of being
satisfactorily repelled. Mere existence is not a predicate, but specifications or
determinations of existence are predicable. Now the argument nowhere implies that
existence is a predicate; it implies only that reality, necessity, and independence of
existence are predicates of existence; and it implies this on the ground that existence
in re can be distinguished from existence in conceptu, necessary from contingent
existence, self-existence from derived existence. That the exclusion of existence --which
here means real and necessary existence --from the idea of God does not leave us with an
incomplete idea of God, is not a position, I think, which can be maintained. Take away
existence from among the elements in the idea of a perfect being, and the idea becomes
either the idea of a nonentity or the idea of an idea, and not the idea of a perfect
being at all.