FREE ESSAY ON HISTORY OF LIGHT INFANTRY

HISTORY OF LIGHT INFANTRY

For a long time peace was understood in negative fashion,
simply as the absence of war.
-Yvon Garlan
Kendrick Pritchett in the introduction to the book "The Greek State at War" points out
that in order to write history of Greek Warfare one 
"...would require a knowledge of many aspects of Greek life. The would-be investigator
would have to be familiar with terrain in the case of any given battle, have an
acquaintance with the archaeological artifacts of various types, close familiarity with
the written sources, and most important, an understanding of the general economic
picture. He would also need some insight into ancient religion and acquaintance with
military and naval procedures and strategy."
There is a definite truth about the statement. Even such narrow subject as development of
light infantry in ancient Greece requires inquiries in multiple areas of overall Greek
history. The knowledge of what ancient Greeks considered light infantry, an insight on
development of ancient Greek infantry in general, agricultural warfare, key historical
event that assisted in changing Greek outlook on war: these areas are absolutely
essential in researching the subject of light infantry in Ancient Greece.
Researching the primary sources for the subject of "light infantry" an investigator would
find a puzzling fact; there are little or no references to the subject of inquiry.
Ancient historians Thucydides, Xenophon, Herodotus, do not refer to "light infantry"
troops, instead they use term peltast. It appears that the term peltast signifies a
"light armored warrior" for the ancient historians. The term itself comes from pelta or
pelte - a small shield that inhabitants of Thrace used as their battle armor. We find
descriptions of Thracian peoples in Herodotus' "The Histories." 
"The Thracians in the army wore fox-skin caps on their heads, and tunics on their bodies;
over these they wore embroidered mantles; they had shoes of fawnskin on their feet and
legs; they also had javelins and little shields and daggers."
Climate in Thrace, both political and weather wise contributed to development of specific
armor (or lack of it) and way of fighting. Ancient Greek historian Xenophon had served
under Odrysian prince Seuthes in Thrace and recorded one of the campaigns in his treaties
"Anabasis." 
From the description, Thrace appears to be very cold and snowy which is not uncommon for
northern parts of Greece. It also explains why Thracian peltasts had no heavy armor,
relied on maneuverability and preferred skirmishing techniques to battle in formation.
Also, there is no account of Thrace developing a city-state or any other kind of
political organization other than tribes. Which explains predominance of primitive way of
fighting over organized formation. Arthur Ferrill argues that although there definitely
was a contact between ancient Greeks and Thracians, it had little or no affect on Greek
warfare in general. This point is arguable, since there is evidence (mostly pottery,
unfortunately) that Thracian shield and helmet designs were used by Greeks from 460 BC
and on. Also the appearance of ekdromoi - runner outs in Greek phalanx, was probably a
result of contact with Thracians. Ekdromoi were young, physically fit warriors that were
instructed to run out and prevent Thracian peltasts from harassing Greek formation.
Consequently, ekdromoi had to give up some of their heavy armor to gain in
maneuverability. Considering evidence in hand, Ferrill's argument appears to be more
plausible since history shows that it would take much more than skirmishes with Thracians
to change Greek outlook on war and fighting.
Agricultural warfare, Greek Hoplites.
Placing light infantry on the battlefield by the ancient Greeks signified the change in
general Greek way of fighting. Roughly, "general way of fighting" is associated with
hoplite phalanx warfare. Understanding hoplite warfare is essential in uncovering the
origins of light infantry aside from it setting the pace of Greek life for almost five
hundred years. 
Sometime between 700 BC and 650 BC formation of heavy infantry or hoplites began to take
place. The changes took place primarily due to social and political developments within
Greece itself, appearance of polis, Greek city-state and extensive agriculture, which
created communities of equal property owners. It is plausible to assume that Greek
farmers out of concern that somebody would traverse their land began to arm themselves,
farmer solidarity developed. Farmers organized in formations - phalanx or several columns
of spearmen armed with shields hoplons (hence the name hoplite) heavy body armor. By
default hoplites formed a heavy infantry unit, considering that in full armor with
shield, sword, greaves, spear, breastplate, helmet and tunic the average weight amounted
to two hundred and twenty pounds. Battles were fought by the way of two phalanx colliding
and then competing in "pushing" or othismos until either side would give up break
formation or attempt to flea the battle field. These shock troops became the object of
admiration for Greeks, praising bravery, camaraderie, and endurance. Close ties developed
with Greek way of life, giving new definition to courage, honor and masculinity. Multiple
references of poets, historians and play-writes indicate fascination with hoplite
warfare. As ancient Greek poet Tyrtaios once said:
"No, No, let him take a wide stance and stand up strongly against them, digging both
heels in the ground, biting his lip with his teeth, covering thighs and legs beneath, his
chest and his shoulders under the hollowed-out protection of his broad shield, while in
his right hand he brandishes his powerful war-spear and shakes terribly the crest high
above his helm." 
Hoplite warfare was the only way of fighting for a period little over two hundred years,
farmers clashing with farmers over parcels of land, it was age when one battle decided
the outcome of "war." This type of warfare first, did not require elaborate tactical
knowledge nor complex logistical systems, second, it was economically inexpensive since
constant drilling and training was unnecessary, at least it seemed that way in Athens.
Arthur Ferrill would argue that training was essential routine for hoplites.
However, multiple primary sources indicate that hoplites primarily were farmers and
concern themselves with land and crops most of the time. Examples of amateur farmers
entering a formation without any prior training are plentiful. Xenophon's account of war
with Corinth 392 BC:
"...On that day, at all events, so many fell within a short time that men accustomed to
see heaps of corn, wood, or stones, beheld then heaps of dead bodies."
Although, one has to agree that Spartan hoplites that were recognized as superior land
force in formation, practiced rigorous training. However, the point stands to be in
phalanx Greeks did not require training, to win the battles drill definitely had its
advantages. 
Meantime aside from inquiry into the roots of ancient Greek way of fighting the subject
of emerging light infantry comes into play in the early fifth century BC. Two significant
events can be credited for initiating military reform in ancient Greece. 
Persian Wars (490, 480 - 478 BC)
Historian Herodotus carefully documented the account of Persian wars in his detailed work
"The Histories." In 490 BC small Persian expeditionary force sent by King Darius met
Athenian phalanx in the battle of Marathon. Persians made a mistake in staking the
outcome of the endeavor on one decisive clash of infantry formations. Considering that
Greeks had two hundred years to practice such way of fighting it appears almost
impossible to see the logic in Darius' decision. But the war was not over yet, victory at
Marathon resulted in Greek confidence in their way of fighting, superiority of the tight
phalanx formation and courage of hoplites seemed to be absolute. In 480 BC King Xerxes,
Darius' son, came back to Ellas. This time Persians were well prepared for a full on
invasion. Herodotus describes different peoples that Xerxes' army employed as mercenaries
on the way to Greece. The army was not a small expeditionary force, but rather an
integrated army, concept yet unfamiliar to Greeks. Xerxes' army had skirmishers, javelin
throwing Thracian peltasts, cavalry, and various types of infantry. For the first time
Greek phalanx were fighting with foreign invaders in a war where stakes were much higher
than a number of cut down trees. The existence of all Greek peoples was at stake. It was
a different type of warfare for Greeks where adversaries employed different, unfamiliar
tactics and engaged in battles not for the sake of solving some property argument but
rather for the domination of all Greece. Therefore, while the expansion of Xerxes'
colossal war machine continued, Athens and Sparta had to devise a way to stop it. So when
the decision was made it reflected the Spartan view, the decision was to stop Xerxes by a
decisive land battle. Armies met in the pass of Thermopylae. 
Following Outline.
1. The battle of Platea 479 BC
Battle that contrasts differences between Eastern and Western (Greek) way of fighting.
Bibliography by Herodotus.
a) Changes within Greek warfare after encountering Persians. New outlook on war
emphasized in Peloponnesian Wars. Reference by Thucydides.
2. Parallel development in Greek weaponry and armament.
Often ignored by historians but appears to be important tendency in the light of Persian
invasion and Peloponnesian war. During the period of 250 years Greek
Hoplites constantly modified their weaponry and armor making it lighter usually due to
discomfort, weight and restricting maneuverability. Bibliography to Xenophon, Diodorus,
Plutarch and Thucydides.
3. Mercenaries and Battle of Cunaxa.
Documented by Xenophon in Anabasis. Cunaxa has importance to the subject of development
of light infantry, since it appears to be first account of changing hoplite units into
more specialized light 
Infantry and missile troops.
4. Iphicrates and Philip || 
Reference to Xenophon, Final stages of merging Eastern and Greek warfare styles, creation
of specialized light infantry units and organizing and integrated army.
5. Conclusion
Brief summary/analysis of events leading to development of light infantry units. Emphasis
on contacts with the Persians and professionalism of mercenaries plus changes in general
view of war by the ancient Greeks as a result of such contacts. 
Bibliography
Hanson, Victor, "The Western Way of War. Infantry Battle in Classical Greece"
Ferrill, Arthur, "The Origins of War. From the Stone Age to Alexander The Great"
Greeks at War, Men at Arms Series (Osprey Publishing, London, 1979)
Herodotus "The Histories" (Penguin, New York, 1996)
* Xenophon in Seven Volumes, 3. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; William
Heinemann, Ltd., London, 1980.)
* Plutarch, "Moralia" http://www.persus.tufts.edu, Persus Project.
* Xenophon, "Hellenica" 
* Xenophon, "Anabasis"
* Diodorus Book 15
* Thucydides "History of Peloponnesian War"
Ancient Greece (Cambridge University Press, 1998)
(*) - Machine readable text
Copyright 1995 Perseus Project, Harvard University.
Bibliography
Hanson, Victor, "The Western Way of War. Infantry Battle in Classical Greece"
Ferrill, Arthur, "The Origins of War. From the Stone Age to Alexander The Great"
Greeks at War, Men at Arms Series (Osprey Publishing, London, 1979)
Herodotus "The Histories" (Penguin, New York, 1996)
* Xenophon in Seven Volumes, 3. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; William
Heinemann, Ltd., London, 1980.)
* Plutarch, "Moralia" http://www.persus.tufts.edu, Persus Project.
* Xenophon, "Hellenica" 
* Xenophon, "Anabasis"
* Diodorus Book 15
* Thucydides "History of Peloponnesian War"
Ancient Greece (Cambridge University Press, 1998)
(*) - Machine readable text
Copyright 1995 Perseus Project, Harvard University.