FREE ESSAY ON HOW AND WHY WAS STALIN ABLE TO GAIN POWER?

HOW AND WHY WAS STALIN ABLE TO GAIN POWER?

There are different interpretations of 'how and why Stalin was able to gain power', either
concentrating on his own actions and abilities, or the situation at the time and the
failure of his opponents. It would appear that the success of Stalin was due to both his
own strengths and actions in the political arena and the weaknesses displayed by his
opponents, in relation to the prevailing circumstances of the time. Stalin was, by
opportunism or careful planning, able to gain control of the party machine and use it to
his advantage, and use his own political skills to out manoeuvre his opponents, while
they often displayed lackluster tactics in a vain attempt to win the support of a party
loyal to Stalin. 
The political positions to which Stalin was elevated within the Communist Party were
undoubtedly of major importance in his successful campaign to establish himself as the
leader of the USSR. Before the death of Lenin it was evident that Stalin had huge power
within the party machine, as Lenin himself expressed in his 'Testament', and Lynch
explains the accumulation of this power in reference to the nature of Soviet government
from 1917 onwards, as the lack of precedent and guidelines led to the creation of
individual advancement which would, ordinarily, not exist. The acquisition by Stalin of
his political offices from 1917 to 1922 increased his power over the party machine
immensely, as he found himself with more authority over both personnel and policy. Most
importantly, his appointment to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party
in 1922 put him in the position of being the 'vital link-man' with access to personal
files of all party members and the responsibility for recording and conveying party
policy. The power of patronage, which also came along with this position, though not
Lenin's intention, gave Stalin the power to place supporters in key positions and the
power to 'hire and fire', thus creating a party owing their membership and loyalty to
him. Stalin could therefore rely on their support to outvote and out manoeuvre
opponents.
"No other contender came anywhere near matching Stalin in his hold on the party machine"
Lynch
Lenin's Enrolment further increased this power over the party machine as the new members,
numbering three hundred thousand, were loyal to Stalin since he had the power to fire
them, thus increasing Stalin's grip on party votes. The attack on factionalism would
provide Stalin with the ability to resist challenges to his new authority. Stalin was
able to exercise such powers in the decisive votes against the proposals of Trotsky and
the left and to defeat their proposals and eventually remove Trotsky from his position as
Commissar for War in 1925. Stalin's also defeated the subsequent challenge by the 'United
Opposition' through his control of the party machine, and was thus able to rid the party
of the opposition which they had formed by relieving Kamenev and Zinoviev of their
positions as Soviet Chairmen, and having Trotsky removed from the party.
Stalin's political skills were influential in his rise to power as he used them to great
effect at key stages throughout the leadership battle. Stalin, quite astutely, began to
take on the 'legacy of Lenin' after the former leader had died in an attempt to show
himself as the natural successor to the leadership of the country. He was able to gain
the initial advantage by delivering the speech at Lenin's funeral and apparently tricking
Trotsky, so that he would not be in attendance. According to Deutchser it was:
"A political error of the first magnitude and dealt a fatal blow to Trotsky's prestige"
Bullock points out that the apparent commitment of Stalin to collective leadership after
the death of Lenin was another astute move to show his dedication to the former leader,
claiming that no one could take Lenin's place and using the ambition of others to brand
them as anti-Leninist and factionalist. Stalin throughout the leadership campaign could
not play on the cult of the personality if he was to succeed as this, according to
Bullock, would prove counter productive in the closed world of the CPSU. He also used the
'legacy of Lenin' to his advantage in defense of the NEP and the commitment to 'Socialism
In One Country', creating the image of Trotsky as anti-Leninist, a policy that helped
distance Trotsky from support within the party. Stalin's ability to appear as a moderate
in the policy debates between the left and the right were crucial to his eventual success
in the leadership challenge, as he was able to expel Trotsky and his allies from the
party, then turn his attentions to defeating his former allies on the right, using his
failure to fully commit to an economic policy to great effect. Lee believes that this
policy of moderation increased the likelihood of his opponents underestimating him,
failing to realize the power of his challenge until it was mounted on them. 
"He was a very skilful politician who had a superb grasp of tactics, could predict
behavior extremely well and had an eye for personal weakness" McCauley
Trotsky, though considered the most capable and most likely successor to Lenin, had
numerous flaws and made several vital errors, which were to be of great significance to
Stalin's eventual rise to power. According to Lee, Trotsky's intellectual character and
as EH Carr points out, his 'European pseudo-Marxism', were counter-productive as they led
to his being distrusted by party colleagues, more sympathetic towards the pro-Slavic line
advanced by Stalin. Trotsky was regarded as an intruder for his Menshevik past, and his
apparent ambition prompted the formation of a triumvirate in 1924 within the politburo
against him, which relied on the unpopularity of Trotsky amongst the party rank and file
to ostracize him. According to Lynch:
"The prevailing view of Party members towards Trotsky is an important part of any
explanation of Trotsky's political failure and Stalin's success"
Trotsky's failure to take the appropriate action at key moments, as he himself pointed
out to Lenin, allowed for Stalin's power within the party to grow unchecked. He was
unable to take advantage of Stalin's mishandling of the Georgian situation, declining to
attack and again missing a vital opportunity when he voted against the publication of
Lenin's 'Testament'. Lynch highlights this moment as vital to Stalin's eventual success,
as the Testament's publication would have had disastrous implications for Stalin's
leadership bid. Lee supports this view, stressing that the publication would have removed
Stalin from high office, since the sentiments expressed were those of Lenin. Trotsky's
poor judgment was also evident when he took action, his condemnation of party bureaucracy
at the Party Congress, Central Committee, Politburo meetings, and in numerous essays. He
made this attack, likely directed at Stalin and his Secretariat, but overlooked the
attitudes of the party rank and file, who had a vested interest in the continuation of
the bureaucracy for their own benefit, and it was viewed as an attack on the form of
government which Lenin had sanctioned from 1917 until his death. He had, according to
Lynch, given Stalin the freedom to take the initiative. While the debate over the NEP was
raging, Trotsky again made a vital error of judgment, forwarding the Menshevik policy of
'Permanent Revolution', which would be detrimental to the USSR's progress as an
industrialized nation, a point which was easily used by Stalin, in the light of a fear of
foreign invasion, to portray Trotsky as an enemy of the state. EH Carr and Deutscher
believe that this was a crucial stage in the campaign as it allowed Stalin to rally
support by taking on the role as a patriot, and silence Trotsky as an effective political
opponent. 
The failure of Communism in the West has also been advanced as an explanation for the
success of Stalin in his rise to power, a view given much support from Lee and Colletti,
who give much emphasis to the failure of the German Revolution is strengthening the
position and policy of Stalin. Stalin was able to promote the policy of 'Socialism In One
Country' and Russian self-reliance as an alternative to the theories expressed by
Trotsky, namely 'Permanent Revolution'. Lee believes that this saved Stalin from his
intellectual inferiority, as he had not cultivated links with Europe. Trotsky, by
comparison, witnessed a major strength of his made redundant and his policies finding
little support at home from a party swayed by Stalin's pro-Slav approach. It was this
Slavic background, according to Lee, which gave him:
"...the best qualification to move Russia away from any ideological or economic
dependence on the West" 
Colletti goes further, to claim that the reactionary wave which swept across Europe in
the aftermath of the 1917 revolution, helped to create the situation where Stalin could
use patriotism to appeal for support. The threat of war, however ill founded, was
influential in Stalin's future policies to ensure Russian survival. 
It would appear an amazing feat that Stalin, the least impressive of the likely
successors to Lenin, would become leader of the USSR. Though totally eclipsed by Trotsky
in the October Revolution and distrusted by Lenin, he had skills that were to prove
useful in a situation were "the set of objective conditions benefited mediocrity over
brilliance." (Lee) The success of Stalin in gaining power was it would appear, the result
of a number of factors, both of his own making and out of his control. The system of
Soviet government had made it possible for Stalin to gain the influence in the party,
which would be vital in crushing any opposition towards him. EH Carr and Deutscher claim
that Stalin had not carefully planned this rise to prominence within the party machinery,
rather he was an opportunist, willing to seize the moment, and thus finding power within
his grasp. This power would be vital in his rise to power as it restricted any real
challenge to the 'vital link-man' of the party, since he could always rely on loyalty
from his appointees. It would appear that Stalin's opponents had serious flaws, which
prevented them from effectively challenging him; Trotsky in particular, had squandered
vital opportunities to change the course of the leadership race, and made serious errors
that effectively ruined his own bid. Stalin though seemed to adapt well to a situation,
which Lee believes suited his style, mediocrity rather than brilliance. He effectively
adopted a centrist approach in the party debates, enabling him to move from one policy to
the next with relative ease in order to eliminate his opponents, a policy made easier by
the apparent threat to Russian survival from the West.